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I. Introduction
The etnpirical ititraday literature has idetitified a cotn-
mon pattern iti returns, variance, and volume across
the trading day. Each measure attains its maximum
value during the opening hour of trading, then falls
monotonically until midday, and then increases mon-
otonically through the close. This pattern is in the
shape of a reverse J, although it is often referred to
in the literature as U-shaped. In an attempt to explain
the reverse-J intraday pattern, two competing theo-
retical frameworks have been developed,' One is
based on the role of private information in trading
behavior, while the other is based on trading stop-
pages. Because most financial markets have private
information and regular trading stops, it has been dif-
* We thank the editor, Albert Madansky, and the referee for
insightful comments that improved the article. We are also grateful
to Bruce Frost of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for providing
data for the artiele. Helpful comments were provided by Cary Col-
lins, Mark Griffiths, David Louton, Stan Smith, Tom Lindley, Hany
•Rjrtle, and participants at the 1999 Financial Management Asso-
ciation session in Orlando,
1, See Atkins and Basu (1995) for a summary of ihe empirical
literature. For the empirical work in specific markets, see, e,g,.
Wood, Mclnish, and Ord (1985). Jain and Joh (1988), Lockwood
and Linn (1990), Laux and Ng (1993), and Lee and Linn (1994),
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The intraday literature
suggests that returns, var-
iances, and volutne form
an intraday reverse-J pat-
tern. Two cotnpeting the-
ories explain the ob-
served patterns: private
information about future
security prices and trad-
ing stoppages. The Fed-
eral funds market allows
a unique opportunity to
study the causes of intra-
day patterns because pri-
vate information common
to most markets does not
play a role in setting
prices. We find reverse-J
variance patterns while
accounting for general-
ized autoregressive condi-
tional heteroskedasticity
(GARCH) model effects.
Our results support trad-
ing stops as an explana-
tion for the reverse-J pat-
tern and suggest that
private information is not
a necessary condition for
the observed pattern.
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ficult empitically to disentangle the competing hypotheses. However, it is our
goal to disentangle the competing hypotheses with intraday tests of the Federal
(Fed) funds market.
The explanations based on private information require different types of
traders with different information sets about future prices. For example, in
their theory for the reverse J, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) define three types
of traders: (1) nondiscretionary liquidity traders who must trade a particular
position at a particular point in time, (2) discretionary liquidity traders who
have the ability to choose the timing of their trades strategically under the
restriction that they must trade a particular position within a given period of
time, and (3) informed traders who are privately informed about an asset's
future returns. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) suggest thai diverse private in-
formation causes trading clusters around the trading of privately informed
traders, which offers an explanation for the observed reverse-J pattern.
Hong and Wang (2000) extend the literature on private information to
explain why trading is clustered at the open and the close.' They show that,
in a market with hedgers (allocational trades) and speculators (private itifor-
mation trades), time-varying hedging dominates the trading at the open and
time-varying information asymmetries dominate the trading at the close, which
creates the observed intraday patterns. Hong and Wang (2000) suggest that
market closures are required to explain the observed intraday patterns in a
market thai necessarily includes private information.
However, Brock and Kleidon (1992) explain clustering at the open and
close in a model that requires only that trading cease at some point. They do
not cotisider private information about future stock prices in their model.
Brock and Kleidon (1992) suggest that increased and less elastic demand to
trade occurs at the open and close of trading for two reasons. First, information
arrives during the overnight nontrading period that causes the end-of-the-day
position to deviate from the optimal position, necessitating trading at the open.
Second, in preparation for the overnight nontrading period, the optimal po-
sition at the close is different from the optimal position during trading hours,
which necessitates trading at the close.
The difficulty in empirically disentangling the effects of private information
and trading stops on the observed reverse-J patterns is that both are common
to most financial markets. However, both effects are not present in the Fed
funds markets. The unique institutional features of the Fed funds market create
a persistent rate-change pattern, which means that if any private information
exists (about future interest rates), it is exceedingly difficult to exploit. There-
fore, private information does not play a role in the rate-generating process
in the Fed funds market. Thus, the Fed funds market provides a tightly defined
experimental setting in terms of the cotnpeting hypotheses.
2. Slezak (t994) also suggests that market closures cause trading lo cluster at the open and
close in markets with private information. However, we focus on Hong and Wang (2000) because
their model is more general.
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Using hourly Fed funds rate changes in conditional variance models, we
find evidence consistent with a reverse-J pattem for intraday volatility. We
also find that the largest intraday rate changes are at the open and close of
trading. However, because of the rules and regulations governing Fed funds,
rates normally decline at the close but often increase at the open, so the
intraday pattern does not form a reverse J.' Our results suggest that private
information is not a necessary condition for the reverse-J pattem. Instead, our
findings suggest that overnight information flows and periodic market trading
stops are sufficient to create the reverse-J pattem.
The article proceeds as follows: Section II discusses the institutional details
of the Fed funds market and relates these details to the two competing hy-
potheses for the reverse-J pattern. Section III describes the data and presents
our methods for the analysis. Section IV presents the results, while Section
V concludes the article by discussing the implications of our findings.
11. The Fed Funds Market: Institutional Details, Models, Empirical
Findings, and Implications for the Reverse-J Pattern
This section provides a thorough discussion of the Fed funds market to show
the unique characteristics that make the market ideal for disentangling the
competing hypotheses for the observed reverse-J pattem. The purpose is to
provide the reader a clear understanding of (1) how this market functions. (2)
the models of the market. (3) the previous empirical findings, and (4) how
the Fed funds market relates to the existing explanations for the reverse-J
pattem. Section II draws heavily from Spindt and Hoffmeister {1988). Griffiths
and Winters (1995. 1997), Hamilton (1996), and Regulation D of the Code
of Federal Regulations (1993). Specific cites will be made when appropriate.
A. Institutional Details
Banks are required by the Federal Reserve to hold a level of reserves (actual
balances) based on a percentage of their deposits (required reserves). On a
biweekly basis, hanks must reconcile their actual reserves to their required
reserves. The reconciliation process is referred to as settlement with the Federal
Reserve. The 2-week period is referred to as a reserve maintenance period.
A maintenance period includes 14 calendar days and normally includes 10
trading days. For each of the 14 calendar days, a bank has actual and required
reserves. The actual and required reserves are based solely on end-ot-day
positions, and nontrading days are assigned the positions from the preceding
trading day. The 14 end-of-day positions for both actual and required reserves
are accumulated and compared for settlement. Since actual and required re-
serves rarely match exactly, successful settlement is achieved when the bank
meets two requirements: (1) total actual reserves within a 4% range around
3. We do not have access to intraday volume data for the broker market for Fed funds and
know of no source for intraday volume in this market.
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their total required reserves and (2) altemating by maintenance period between
settling with excess reserve (actual reserve > required reserves) and short
reserves (actual reserves < required reserves)."" When a bank has successfully
settled with the Federal Reserve, any deviation between actual and required
reserves is carried forward as the starting position for the next maintenance
period (Griffiths and Winters 1995).
As part of managing their actual reserves for successful settlement, banks
trade reserves. The trades are Fed funds transactions. The primary reason for
the trading of Fed funds is the management of reserves to achieve successful
settlement with the Federal Reserve. In effect, banks that are deficient in their
reserve accounts must trade regardless of the borrowing rate, and those with
excess reserves have an incentive to trade at any positive rate once the required
reserves plus maximum amount to carry over to the next period are met.
Because all traders have 2 weeks in which to trade to achieve successful
settlement with the Federal Reserve, they match the Admati and Pfleiderer
(1988) definition for discretionary liquidity traders.
The Fed funds market is a market for interbank loans. Because it is a loan
market, the parties to a Fed funds trade require a loan agreement. Since a
loan agreement is required, banks maintain open lines of credit with other
banks to facilitate trading. Thus, a trade in the brokered Fed funds markets
requires (1) a standing loan agreement with the counter-party in the trade and
(2) sufficient credit available under the loan agreement to accommodate the
size of trade desired. Thus, the Fed funds market does not have specialists
with private information about order fiow making a market that could profit
from strategic behavior.
Successful settlement with the Federal Reserve is the primary focus of a
bank's reserve account management. Thus, based on the settlement rules, the
end-of-the-day actual balance is the primary target in reserve account man-
agement. Banks track their reserve balances continually throughout the day;
however, the balance they track to the end of the day is an estimate because
of issues related to the clearing process. Banks are notified by the Federal
Reserve of their actual end-of-the-day balance prior to the open of trading
the next day. This feature of the Fed funds market is similar to equity market
information arrival when the market is closed.
B. Fed Fund Market Models
Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988) developed a model of the daily and intraday
variances in the Fed funds market. Their model focuses on the end-of-the-
day accounting rules for settlement and shows that the periodic accounting
for reserve balances creates predictable patterns in the variance. Spindt and
Hoffmeister (1988) predict that (1) daily variances are heteroskedastic: (2)
daily variances increase as settlement approaches, with settlement Wednesday
4. When a bank settles with the Federal Reserve, with actual reserves = required reserves,
the bank can be either long or short in the next reserve maintenance period.
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having the largest daily variance; and (3) aftemoon variances are larger than
moming variances. They do not include ovemight factors in their model.
Griffiths and Winters (1995) extend the Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988)
model to examine daily rate changes. Griffiths and Winters's (1995) model
of daily rate changes is based on the asymmetry of the possible settlement
positions and the end-of-the-day accounting rules. They show that settling
with excess reserves is a lost investment opportunity while settling with a
short reserve position is an extra investment using an interest-free loan from
the Federal Reserve. Based on the asymmeUic positions, Griffiths and Winters
(1995) predict daily rate changes as follows: (1) rates decline in general across
the settlement period. (2) rates decline on Fridays. (3) rates decline on the
second T i^esday (the day before settlement), and (4) rates increase on settle-
ment Wednesday.* The model is hased on end-of-the-day positions and thus
does not make intraday predictions.
C Previous Empirical Results in Fed Funds
The empirical results for daily and intraday variances in the Fed funds market
are as follows: Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988). using Parkinson's (1980) ex-
treme-value method variance estimator with daily high and low rates, find
that daily variances are heteroskedastic, with settlement Wednesday having
the largest daily variance. Griffiths and Winters (1995), using daily high and
low rates, verify the findings of Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988). In addition,
using moming and aftemoon high and low rates, Griffiths and Winters (1995)
find that aftemoon variances are higher than moming variances. Using closing
rates, Griffiths and Winters (1997) find results consistent with previous studies
for daily variances in Fed funds and ovemight govemment repos.^ Cyree and
Winters (2001) use hourly Fed funds rates in conditional variance models and
find that, on average, ovemight and aftemoon variances add to the conditional
variance. Cyree and Winters also find strong autoregressive conditional het-
eroskedasticity (ARCH) and generalized autoregressive conditional heteros-
kedasticity (GARCH) effects in the variance equation, which suggests that
intraday studies of the Fed funds market should control for these effects.
The empirical results on rate changes under the current biweekly reserve
maintenance period start with Saunders and Urich (1988). They find that rates
generally decline across the 2-week maintenance period. Griffiths and Winters
(1995), using daily high and low rates, find that rates (I) decline on Fridays,
(2) decline on the second Tuesday (the day before settlement), and (3) increase
5. Each reserve maintenance period covers 2 weeks, so each maintenance period has two
Mondays, [wo Tuesdays, etc. Because the models of the Fed funds market make predictions for
specific days of the maintenance period, the standard convention in the Fed funds literature is
to identify the days with their week and day reference, such a."; first Tuesday. The one exception
is the second Wednesday, whicb is referred to as setttemenl Wednesday to denote the end of the
reserve maintenance period and settlement with the Federal Reserve.
6. Griffiths and Winters (1997) discuss overnight govemment repos as a substitute a.sset for
Federal Reserve settlement and show that the pattems created by the settlement rules spill over
into the market for the substitute asset.
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on settlement Wednesday. Hamilton (1996) finds the same rate-change pattern
as do Griffiths and Winters (1995) in the effective Fed funds rate. The effective
Fed funds rate is a transaction-weighted daily average. From these results,
Hamilton (1996) concludes that rate changes do not follow a Martingale
process and, thus, that banks do not view reserves on different days as perfect
substitutes. Griffiths and Winters (1997) also find the same rate-change pattern
in overnight government repo rates, which is a substitute asset for Fed funds
in settlement with the Federal Reserve. Cyree and Winters (2001) find the
same rate-change pattern using closing rates in conditional variance models
with no evidence of volatility-in-mean effects. Cyree and Winters extend their
analysis to hourly rates in conditional variance models with dummy variables
for the overnight (close to open) and afternoon (noon to close) time periods,
and they find results similar to their results using closing rates.
D. The Reverse-J Pattern
In this section, we present the primary features of the competing hypotheses
and how these features relate to the Fed funds market. We begin with the
features of the private information theories and then discuss the features of
trading stoppages.
Private information. Private information is defined as information about
future securities prices. If private information is exploitable and thus affects
security prices, then the market must have different types of traders. Admati
and Pfleiderer (1988) suggest three trader types and discuss how the strategic
hehavior of the different trader types creates trading clusters.' In Section IID,
we discuss the trader types apparent in the Fed funds market and the role of
private information.
Each reserve maintenance period is 2 weeks long, but at the end of the 2-
week period, each bank must settle its reserve account position with the Federal
Reserve. Since the banks must settle but have some discretion on when they
trade to achieve settlement, the banks are discretionary liquidity traders under
the trader types defined by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). Discretionary li-
quidity traders have the ability to time their trades strategically and therefore
have the opportunity to exploit private information. However, in the Fed funds
market, if private information about future interest rates (security prices in
this market) exists, it is exceedingly difficult to exploit.
The existing empirical work on the Fed funds market shows a persistent
pattern in rate changes. A persistent pattern in any market provides a profitable
opportunity to informed traders unless other market features dominate the
apparent profits from trading on the pattern. The pattern in the Fed funds
market is consistent with the incentives created by the rules and regulations
governing the settlement process with the Federal Reserve. Thus, it appears
7. Hong and Wang (2{MH)) suggest two differeni trader lypes: hedgers and speculators. However,
we cho.se to use the three trader types from Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) in our discussions of
trader types.
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that successful settlement with the Federal Reserve dominates profitable trad-
ing opportunities as the primary trading objective. In'addition. Brown et al.
(1999) identify a profitable trading strategy in the Fed funds market that
persists. They suggest that the profitability of the trading strategy persists
because the need to settle with the Federal Reserve dominates any risky
profitable trading strategy. Accordingly, we conclude that private information
does not have a role in setting interest rates (prices) in this market.
Fven with a rate-change pattern consistent with the incentives created by
the settlement rules and regulations, there may be a concern about the lack
of a role for private information given the correspondent relationship between
large and small banks in the Fed funds market. Small banks typically lend
their excess reserves to their correspondent bank, which could provide the
correspondent banks with private information about available reserves. We
remove the role of correspondent relationships in rate setting by using only
data from the broker market for Fed funds. Stigum (1990) notes that the
broker market is for the top 500 U.S. banks plus some foreign banks.
For the banks that regularly trade in the brokered Fed funds market, there
may be concern about private information about customer cash flows. Spindt
and Hoffmeister (1988) model the customer cash flows through a bank's
reserve account as stochastic, and our discussions about intraday reserve ac-
count cash flows with Fed funds traders support describing these cash flows
as stochastic cash flows. The traders indicate that some cash flows are pre-
dictable, but they are industry-wide cash flows such as social security checks.
Accordingly, we do not believe a set of better-informed traders exists in the
brokered Fed funds market.
There remains one trader affecting the Fed funds market that may act as
an informed trader in the Fed funds market. That trader is the open market
desk. The open market desk regularly trades short-term government repos
with the policy objective of attaining the target Fed funds rate. If the open
market trading desk is an informed trader trading on private information, then
the theory developed by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) suggests that trading
will cluster around the trading of the open market desk. Open market desk
trading has the unique feature that it occurs one time each day: the timing of
the trading is always in the late morning. Thus, if the open market desk is
an informed trader trading on private information, then we would expect to
find high intraday rate changes and volatility in the late morning in the Fed
funds market. We know of no prior research on intraday Fed funds market
behavior around open market desk trading. We will present our intraday results
hourly and will discuss the results from late in the morning as they relate to
the informed trader role of the open market desk.
Finally, some of the work on private information has examined the role of
market specialists. For example, Stoll and Whaley (1990) suggest that the
high volatility at the open is from the strategic behavior of the market specialist
using the private information available to that specialist. However, Ekman
(1992) and Sheikh and Ronn (1994) find U-shaped intraday patterns in markets
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without specialists. Accordingly, the presence of a market speciahst may be
a sufficient condition for the reverse-J intraday pattern, but it is not a necessary
condition. The brokered market for Fed funds does not have a market
specialist.
Trading .stoppages. Brock and Kleidon (1992) suggest that in preparation
for the overnight nontrading period, the optimal position at the close is dif-
ferent from the optimal position during trading hours. Their findings suggest
that trading stoppages cause the need to trade at the close of daily trading.
In Fed funds, settlement with the Federal Reserve is based only on a bank's
reserve position at the close of each trading day. Spindt and Hoffmeister
(1988) base their model on the end-of-the-day accounting system and predict
higher intraday variance at the close, as banks more aggressively trade at the
end of the day to offset deviations from their end-of-the-day target reserve
balance.
In addition. Brock and Kleidon (1992) suggest that information arrives
during the nontrading period that causes the end-of-the-day position to deviate
from the optimal position, which causes a need to trade at the open. In the
Fed funds market, the end-of-the-day actual reserve position is an estimate.
Prior to the next day's open, the Federal Reserve notifies each bank of any
change in its end-of-the-day estimate to arrive at its actual closing position.
Thus, new information arrives overnight that may require banks to trade at
the open to achieve its desired position.
In summary, the institutional features of the Fed funds market fit closely
with the primary features of the Brock and Kleidon (1992) model, which is
based on trading stoppages. In addition, the Fed funds market provides a rare
opportunity to isolate and test the effects of trading stoppages on trading
behavior because private information about future returns does not play a role
in the rate-generating process.
III. Data and Methods
A. Data
Our data are intraday Fed funds rates collected from the daily logs of the
Intemational Monetary Market Division of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
The Intemational Monetary Market purchases the data from Telerate Cor-
poration, which acquires the data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. We have the following intraday rates: (I) hourly rates from 9:00 A.M.
to 3:00 P.M. Eastern time and (2) the closing rate (6:30). The Fed funds broker
market opens at 8:30 A.M., SO our first daily rate observation (9:00 A.M.) is
a half hour after the open of trading. The rates are bid-side broker quotes.
Having only bid-side quotes removes any possible problems related to switch-
ing between bid and ask prices. The data cover the period from February 2,
1984, to January 31, 1996. The beginning of the period coincides with the
Federal Reserve's switch to biweekly settlement.
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TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics for the Hourly Fed Funds Rates
9:00 A.M.
10:00 A.M.
ILOO A.M.
12:00 P.M.
1:00 P.M.
2:00 P.M.
3:00 P.M.
Close
9:00 A.M.
10:00 A.M.
11:00 A.M.
12:00 P.M.
1:00 P.M.
2:00 P.M.
3:00 P.M.
Close
Mean
6.53
6.54
6.54
6.54
6.54
6.54
6.55
6.50
.024
.002
.002
-.004
-.005
-.003
.001
-.019
Median
Panel
6.56
6.56
6.56
6.56
6.56
6.56
6.56
6.50
Panel B,
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
SD Max
A. Hourly Average Rates
2.19
2.19
2.20
2.20
2.20
2.20
2.20
2.23
Rate Change
.40
.07
.06
.07
.10
.10
.15
.29
11.94
12.50
12.50
12.50
12.50
12.25
12.50
13.00
Min
2.81
2.81
2.81
2.75
2.63
2.63
2.00
LOO
by Observation
5.12
1.00
1.00
1.06
1.38
1.00
3.00
3.50
-5.69
-1.00
-1.00
- .63
-2.25
-2.00
-2.50
-3.50
Range
9.13
9.69
9.69
9.75
9.87
9.63
10.50
12.00
10.81
2.00
2.00
1.69
3.63
3.00
5.50
7.00
NoTh. —The rates are (I) hourly from 9:00 A.M. to 3;00 P.M. Ea.'Jtem standard time and (2) at the close
(6:30 P.M.), The dailj open of trading is at 8:30 A.M. The sample period covers from February 2. 1984, to
ianuniy 31. 1996. All numbers are presented as percentuges. Max = maximum; min = minimum.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics. Panel A provides statistics on
rates at each of our intraday sampling points. Panel B presents statistics for
rate changes between each of our intraday sampling points. Panel A shows
that the average rate is surprisingly similar across the intraday sampling points.
The statistics do hint at the variance increasing toward the end of the day.
Panel B shows that the largest rate changes occur at the close and ovemight.
The declining rates at the close are consistent with the incentive to run a short
position in reserves, as discussed in Griffiths and Winters (1995). The standard
deviations and ranges show a reversc-J pattern for intraday volatility. However,
we need to emphasize that these are preliminary results for two reasons. First,
these are average results across the time series. To support an intraday pattem
properly, we must show that the pattem exists on each trading day. Accord-
ingly, we will examine separately each of the 10 trading days of the reserve
maintenance period for evidence of a reverse-J pattern. Second, Cyree and
Winters (2001), using a time series of hourly rates, find ARCH, GARCH, and
asymmetric effects in the conditional variance. Thus, as we examine each
trading day, we must control for conditional variance effects properly to isolate
intraday changes related to the time of the day.
B. Methods
We use a GARCH model with the conditional variance equation, as proposed
by Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993), with a modification from Ham-
ilton (1996). We selected the Glosten et al. (1993) variance model because
of its definition of the asymmetric term in the conditional variance; we then
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modified the variance model to subtract the expected value at time r, as in
Hamilton (1996).** This conditional variance model contains an intercept and
three prespecified variables in the variance equation: (I) a trend term (referred
to as an ARCH effect), (2) a persistence term (a GARCH effect), and (3) a
sign of the error term (an asymmetric effect). The asymmetric term allows
that certain errors are more important to the market than other errors and
conditions the variance based on the sign of the error term. The Glosten et
al. (1993) asymmetric term is a binary dummy variable that we feel is in-
tuitively appealing for the Fed funds market.
The Glosten et al. (1993) model is a specific application of a GARCH
model (as originally proposed by Engle [1982] and generalized by Bollerslev
[I986J) that, by design, accounts for the time-varying variance. The Glosten
et al. (1993) model's mean equation for day ; of the reserve tnaintenance
period is^
R, - /?,_, = /3,D, + /3,,D,o + /3,,^i, + |3,2O,, + /3,_,Z),,, + ^ ^ D H
+ ^,,D,, + ^,,_D,,^,, + e., (1)
where
R, = the Fed funds rate at time t during day y,'"
D, = 0 / 1 dummy variable, Z)y = 1 for the overnight time period from
the close to 9:00 A.M. and 0 otherwise, Z)^ i,,,^  = 1 for the trading period at
the close and 0 otherwise, D,^, = I for the trading period from 9:00 A.M.
to 10:00 A.M. and 0 otherwise, with D,, - £),, defined in a similar manner
for the hours from 11:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. Eastern time,
e, = the error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed.
The Glosten et al. (1993) model accounts for asymmetric variance effects in
the conditional variance equation. The conditional variance equation for the
Glosten et al. (1993) model on day j is
a,' - K, - tto + a,(e'_, - «,-,} + a.ia^.^ - K,. ,) + a^Ce l^, - «,_,)/„ (2)
where
8. We also tested two other specitications of GARCH to ensure that our results were not an
artifact of our model choice. The other models are the EGARCH specification suggested by
Nelson (1991) with two differeni specifications of the error term in the mean equation: (1) normal
distribution of errors and (2) GED distribution of errors. The results from these specifications
are qualitatively similar to the results reported. They are not reported for brevity but are available
on requesl.
9. There are 10 trading days in a reserve maintenance period, so j varies from 1 to 10. We
estimate the model separately for each trading day, soj is not included in the model notation.
Glosten et al. (1993) use nonstandard notation in their GARCH mode!. We cho.se to present our
model using standard notation (.see, e.g., Chou, Engle. and Kane 1992). with the addition of the
Gloslen et al. (1993) asymmelric lerm in the conditional variance equation.
10. We note that Fed funds trade at face value with interest paid separately. This means that
the Fed funds rate is the price of the instrument. Thus, our first difference in Fed funds rates is
a standard return calculation.
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+ 7do.eA-,o.e (3)
and /, = a dummy variable equal to 1 if the lagged error is negative and 0
otherwise. The indicator variable accounts for asymmetry in the conditional
variance equation as the addition to variance based on the sign of last period's
error.
The dummy variables in equation (3) are as defined above for equation (1).
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The subtraction of K, is similar
to Hamilton (1996) and models the variance in terms of the deviations from
the unconditional expectation K, for each period." If we did not write the
model in terms of deviations from the unconditional expectation, the system-
atic changes over the day would he obscured by the GARCH dynamics; for
example, if 7^ ^ 7,0, the difference would be carried over into the next period
through the lagged variance term. The ARCH, GARCH, and asymmetric terms
represent these effects over and above the expected value of the variance,
given we are at hour /. In this manner, the coefficients on the dummies in the
variance equation represent the expeeted incremental change in variance for
hour /, and the other GARCH effects incorporate these expectations.
Equation (1) is the mean equation for the GARCH model and includes a
0/1 dummy variable for each of the trading hours during a reserve maintenance
period day. We keep all the dummy variables and omit an intercept so that
the independent variables will not be linearly dependent. This specification
allows us to retain the information about each observation during a trading
day. Equation (2) is the variance equation and includes all hourly dummy
variables from equation (3) and an intercept. This is appropriate in the con-
ditional variance equation of a GARCH model because the intercept represents
the unconditional variance and the other variables represent conditioning
effects.'^
We estimate the model for each of the 10 trading days of the reserve
maintenance period." EsUmating the model separately for each of the 10
trading days is very important for addressing the theories for the reverse-J
pattern. To identify a regular intraday pattern, one must show that the pattern
11. Note that Hamilton's (1996) definition is for daily effects, whereas our variable represents
hourly effects. We ihank an anonymous referee for suggesting this specification to avoid a self-
imposed systematic pattern.
12. We note that the GARCH literature often assumes the presence of ARCH and GARCH
effects. tJnder this assumption ihe inlercepl is not the unconditional variance. However, if one
does not presuppose the existence of ARCH, GARCH, or hourly effects, then the intercept is
the unconditional variance.
13. With a sample period from February 2. 1984, to January 31, 1996, we have approximately
300 observations for each intraday sampling point for each day for all trading days except
Mondays. Mondays have approximately 270 observations at each intraday sampling period. The
lower number of observations on Mondays results from the concentration of nontrading holidays
on Monday. The actual number of observations varies slightly because of a few missing obser-
vations and a few trading days that close early.
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dominates across the different trading days of the market being studied. For
most markets, this means finding the pattern on each day of the week (Jain
and Joh 1988; Mclnish and Wood 1992). However, because the Fed funds
market operates on 2-week cycles, this means finding the pattern on each of
the 10 trading days of the reserve maintenance period. Examining each day
separately is particularly important in the Fed funds market because certain
days have unique trading pressures related to the reserve maintenance process.
Previously, Griffiths and Winters (1995) and Cyree and Winters (2001)
have shown that, on average, afternoon variances are larger than morning
variances, and Cyree and Winters have shown that, on average, overnight
variances are higher than morning variances. These results hint at the presence
of a reverse-J pattern. However, these studies do not show whether these
results are common to each day of the reserve maintenance period or are the
result of a few unique days. In addition, both studies define the morning to
cover the time period from the market open until noon and the afternoon to
cover the time period from noon to market elose at 6:30 P.M. Accordingly,
these studies provide no insight into the shape of the hourly pattern across
the day.
IV. Results
Tables 2 and 3 present the results from estimating the conditional mean and
conditional variance models for each of the 10 trading days of the reserve
maintenance period. Table 2 presents the mean equation results, and table 3
presents the conditional variance results. In Section IV, we first discuss the
results in the mean equation to verify prior research and the validity of our
model. We next discuss the intraday variance results to see if there is support
for the reverse-J pattern in volatility in a market where private information
does not play a role in setting prices.
A. Intraday Conditional Mean Rate-Change Results
The incentives created by the rules of the Fed funds market suggest that rates
should decline at the end of the day (except for settlement Wednesday) because
it is an advantage to all banks to maintain actual reserve positions that are
less than their required reserve positions. Following the end-of-the-day pres-
sures, we expect rates to rebound at the open. Thus, intraday rate changes
should not form a reverse-J pattern. However, the mean equation results are
interesting for two reasons. First, we verify that our results are consistent with
prior research and not unique to our model and data. Second, we show that
the largest intraday rate pressures are at the open and close of the trading
day.
Table 2 reports the results from the mean equation for the Glosten et al.
(1993) model by the trading day of the reserve maintenance period. We find
that, in absolute value terms, the overnight rate change is the largest rate
Federal Funds Market 547
o -a
W5 U.
§ 1
C- I I I "^ ~
c in o —
I I I I
' T
888
—' 00 r ^
8^8
o in
— -c
o m
I = I 7 I •?
tn (N O
O ^ C 00
I I I I
— .—,— , - . r j . — (N —,— —.— ,—.00 ^ ^ r J —.
— ^ O Q o o r ^ O — ^ ( N i n i ^ m o \ ^ i n o o — 'f N | ( Y d O r ' ' d O ' ^ Q O O f N Q f N O o O . . — 00
O ' O o O o t ^ o i n o f ^ O Q o ' n c o o
l' — l' I* ' — ' — ' —I ' rs ' rs ' •~'
g
.2 "^
13 c
E ^
E3T3
;s
en
re
pr
t
—
u-i
u
•S
^
'S
il
•s
an
t 
i
u
ifi
s
DO
548 Journal of Business
O^  O (N O O O
r<-, .— —
O -^ CO —
O (N O O
i2 I I I I I I I
.— r^ v — r«^ — — — QO
o o O O N O
(N — — —
a^ 0 0
—. H-, —. 00
O O O O ^ - f N O f N O ^ O W ^ O ^
v d | " w S * O v I ' t N I ' r ' i I ' r f l | ' r ^
Federal Funds Market 549
f^; O o-i fN oc
— * 00 ' —
oc vC (N 00 —
— n — 00 QC » o r^  p
00 — —f^ .— — —. TT —^.
— n-j — C O^  —
r-t r-i fN oo (N —1O O\ C 00 C iD
o ^o r- >c (N
r~- o T. rr.
~ 00 3- r-
O — O ("1
q q c — p
— I
I C
(N U", — OO O
- -5
.a
« E
550 Journal of BusiDess
change for 6 of 10 trading days and is the second largest rate change on one
other day. We should note that the ovemight rate change is from the close of
the previous day to 9:00 A.M. of the current day, and since trading opens at
8:30 A.M., theovemight period includes the first half hour of the day's trading.
The rate change at the close is the largest intraday rate change during 4 of
the 10 trading days and is the second largest on another 3 days. This suggests
that a general pattem exists, with the largest intraday rate changes occurring
at the open and the close of trading. These pattems are generally consistent
with existing intraday literature. The pattems in intraday rate changes are also
consistent with the existing literature on daily Fed funds rate changes. Our
model is on a day-hy-day hasis and confirms that the general effeets are not
because of a single day hut generally appear across days in the reserve main-
tenance period.
B. Intraday Conditional Variance Results
Table 3 reports the Glosten et al. (1993) conditional variance parameter es-
timates. We find strong evidence of consistent ARCH and GARCH effects
across the trading days. Specifically, we find significant at the 1% level and
positive ARCH effects on all 10 trading days, and we find significant at the
1% level and positive GARCH effects for 9 of 10 trading days (the first
Thursday is significant and negative). These results suggest that trends exist
in the intraday variances (ARCH effects) and that intraday variances are
persistent (GARCH effects).
For intraday variances, we are concerned with the incremental effect of
each hour of the individual trading day, and the coefficients on the dummies
in the variance equations capture these effects. Thus, if the intraday variance
pattems are present in these coefficients, the effect is not because of (1)
informed traders, (2) private information, (3) profit motives, or (4) GARCH
effects.''^  Therefore, reverse-J or similar pattems in Fed funds represent a
direct test that intraday pattems are likely because of ovemight information
arrival that affects the beginning of trading and late-day positioning for the
ovemight nontrading period that influences the close.
The parameter estimates for intraday variances are reported in table 3 as
7g-7is and 7^ .|,,,^ , where -y^ represents the ovemight variance. The results show
that the largest intraday variance occurs overnight for 8 of the 10 trading
days.'^ The ovemight variance is the second largest intraday variance on
14. Hasbrouck (1999) examines intraday bid-ask spreads. He finds common cost components
in the bid-ask spread and argues that these costs reflect risk as proxied for by the ARCH model
variance.
15. Note that the each dummy variance provides the incremental effect on the conditiona!
variance at time (. Accordingly, the largest intraday variance occurs with either the largest positive
parameter or the least negative parameter, such as on the first Friday where the ovemight parameter
of —0,01143 is the least negative parameter during the day.
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another trading day."' The variance at the close has the largest intraday variance
for 2 of the 10 trading days and the second largest variance on another 7
trading days. Interestingly, the overnight variance is largest for the first 8
trading days, while the variance at the close is largest for the last 2 trading
days. Also, the trading day where the overnight variance is not one of the
two largest intraday variances is settlement Wedne.sday, where the largest
intraday variance is at the close and the second largest intraday variance is
at 3:00 P.M.
Figure 1 plots the 7 parameter estimates and contains 10 graphs, one for
each of the 10 trading days of the reserve maintenance period. The graphs
show a reverse-J pattern over the first 8 trading days of the reserve maintenance
period and a J pattern over the last 2 trading days of the reserve maintenance
period.'^ These results suggest that the pattern of the largest intraday variances
at the open and close of trading occurs across the days of the reserve main-
tenance period, and thus they are not the result of a few trading days. These
results are consistent with the existing intraday literature.'^
Finally, we note that we found no evidence of high intraday variance in
the late morning hours, which suggests that Fed funds trading does not cluster
around open market desk daily trading. This suggests either (I) that the open
market desk is an exogenous factor to Fed funds rate behavior or (2) that the
16. A possible explanation for the high variance at the open for which we do not control is
regular macroeconomic announcements. Christie-David and Chaudhry (1999) show that ma-
croannouncements cause intraday variance spikes in interest-rale-based financial futures. They
document that the first announcement of a day is at 7:30 A.M. Central time (the same time as
the open of the Fed funds market) and that the variance spike occurs during the following 15-
minute time interval. TTiey also document that during their sample period (January 3, 1994-De-
cember 29, 1995) there were not any 7:30 A.M. announcements on Mondays. Based on the
Christie-David and Chaudry (1999) results, we believe our results are not caused by macroec-
onomic announcements because our Monday variance pattern matches those of the other days
of the week and they find no Monday 7:30 A.M. macroannouncements in iheir sample.
17. To verify further the shapes of the intraday variance graphs, we examine the 95% confidence
intervals for the parameter estimates on each of the 10 trading days. We do not include the
confidence intervals in tig. 1 because on 4 of the 10 trading days the confidence intervals were
narrow enough to appear as a single line in our graphs. The reason for examining the confidence
intervals is to determine if intraday pattems in shapes other than a J or a reverse J are possible
within the confidence intervals. For 9 of the 10 trading days, intraday pattems other than a J or
reverse J are not possible within the confidence interval. The one exception is the first Wednesday,
where ihe confidence interval is wide enough to accommodate shapes that differ significantly
from the shape of the graph for the first Wednesday in fig. 1.
18. It is well known that retums and variance across longer time intervals are expected to be
greater than the relurns and variance across shoner time intervals, ceteris paribus. Our largest
intraday variances are from close to 9:00 A.M. and from 3:(X) P.M. to close, which cover longer
time intervals than our other intraday intervals. Thus, our results could be an artifact of our
intraday data sampling points. To check for the problem ol" different time intervals, we scale the
close-9:00 A.M. variance for each day and compare it to the 9:00 A.M.-10:00 A.M. variance for
the same day: we also scale the 3:00 p.M.-close variance and compare it to the 2:00 P.M.-3:00
P.M. variance from the same day. Using a means difference test, we find that the scaled close-
9:00 A.M. variance is significantly larger than the 9:00 A.M.-IO:OO A.M. variance on 7 of the 10
trading days. We also find that the scaled 3:00 p.M.-close variance is significantly larger than
the 2:00 P.M.-3:00 P.M. variance on the same 7 trading days. These results suggest that intraday
J curve in Fed funds is not an artifact of the data sampling intervals.
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desk is able to disguise its trading motives when it trades on private
information.'^
V. Discussion of Results and Implications
The goal of this article is to test whether the reverse-J pattern for volatility
can exist in the absence of private information. To avoid the difficulty of
identifying different trader types in equity markets, we examine intraday pat-
terns in the broker market for overnight Fed funds. The unique rules and
limited market entry provide a tightly defined experimental setting in terms
of the theoretical issues related to the reverse-J pattern. Tbe unique rules and
limited market entry create a persistent pattern in rate changes over the 2-
week reserve maintenance period, which means tbat if any private information
about future returns (or interest rate changes in this market) exists, it is ex-
ceedingly difficult to exploit. Thus, private information is not a pricing factor
in the Fed funds market. Accordingly, in tbis market, all the traders are
discretionary liquidity traders, and the primary objective in trading is suc-
cessful settlement with the Federal Reserve.
We use a Glosten et al. (1993) GARCH model tbat models asymmetry in
tbe variance term. Tbis model is chosen because of its simplicity and ability
to account for ARCH and GARCH effects, which are sbown to be important
in Fed funds by Hamilton (1996) in daily average rates and by Cyree and
Winters (2001) in bourly rates. Our results provide convincing evidence that
the intraday pattern in Fed funds variances is consistent witb the previously
identified pattern in tbe microstructure literature, which is tbat the largest
intraday variances occur at the open and tbe close of trading. We also provide
evidence tbat the pattern is not because of GARCH effects. Tbe focus of most
of tbe theories that bave developed to explain tbis intraday pattern is private
information about future security returns. However, private information about
future returns does not play a role in Fed funds rate changes.
Our results suggest that private information is not a necessary condition
for the reverse-J pattern. Instead, our results support the model by Brock and
Kleidon (1992), who suggest that information arrives during tbe overnight
nontrading period that causes the end-of-the-day position to deviate from the
optimal position, necessitating trading at the open. Brock and Kleidon (1992)
also indicate that tbe optimal position at tbe close is different from tbe optimal
position during trading hours, which necessitates trading at the close in prep-
aration for the overnight nontrading period. The institutional features of tbe
Fed funds market clearly fit tbe trading bebavior described in the Brock and
Kleidon (1992) model.
Our results do not state tbat private information does not play a role in
19. See Singh and Zak (1992) for a discussion of the need of the open market desk to disguise
its open market interventions to protect its private information, and of how the desk can disguise
it.s trading on private informalion.
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intraday pattems in other securities markets but, rather, that private information
is not a necessary condition for the observed intraday pattem. Admati and
Pfleiderer (1988) suggest that private infomiation creates trading clusters, and
Hong and Wang (2000) suggest that U-ading will cluster at the open and close
in markets with private infomiation and ovemight trading stops. Thus, private
information may have a role in the size and shape of the observed reverse-J
pattems. However, our findings suggest that periodic closures can cause the
empirically verified reverse-J intraday pattem in the absence of exploitable
private information. One implication of our findings is that the increased
volatility resulting from periodic market closures eould be mitigated by avoid-
ing market closure and, instead, by having 24-hour trading.
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